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This Article identifies the key role that institutions play in
moving toward an effective cross-border regime in property law.
Property is based on an in rem principle, which should provide
a single system for ranking rights, powers, and priorities in
assets that applies to all interested parties. In a global context,
this feature of property law requires a cross-border legal
ordering by an array of domestic and supranational
institutions: legislative, administrative, and adjudicative.
The Article argues that the present fragmentation of
property norms across national borders, and the incompleteness
of supranational institutions that deal with property law, may
place limits on the ability to create and enforce a comprehensive
global ordering of property rights. This current deficiency
impacts a broad plethora of assets: land, tangible goods,
monetary claims, intellectual property and other intangible
assets, and resources uch as tradable emission rights. Whereas
"soft law" instruments do not require binding supranational
institutions, the need for such institutions proves critical for
more ambitious strategies for globalization, such as increasing
attempts to provide supranational constitutional protection of
the right to property, or establishing a property law
infrastructure for a global market in capital, goods, and
servces.
* Dean and Atara Kaufman Professor of Real Estate, Radzyner Law School, and
Academic Director, Gazit-Globe Real Estate Institute, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC)
Herzliya.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Institutions play a key role in the ability of top-down actors, such
as states, and bottom-up ones, such as individuals or corporations, to
promote various strategies for globalization. This Article argues that
the challenge of establishing authorized and coordinated institutions
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in the global context is particularly difficult-but is nevertheless
essential-in the case of property systems.
Property law is based on creating norms for the in rem ranking
of rights, powers, and priorities in regard to assets.' This means that
property legal interests, such as ownership, leases, security interests,
and servitudes, possess a qualitative trait of general applicability
toward a broad class of stakeholders. Property law establishes a set of
legal rights, powers, and priorities in regard to various types of
assets: land, tangible goods, intellectual property and other
intangible assets, and resources such as tradable emission rights.
Unlike purely contractual disputes, legal scenarios such as conflicting
sale transactions, good faith purchase of voidable or void title to
assets, and bankruptcies with multiple creditors fighting over priority
to a limited pool of the debtor's assets highlight how property law
must often decide conflicts between parties that have no contractual
privity or any type of preset arrangement for dispute resolution.2
Accordingly, the in rem principle of property should optimally
provide a single ranking of property interests for different types of
assets through structural and legal features, such as some version of
a "closed list" principle, registries and other forms of publicity, and
principles for the prioritization of certain interests over others.3 From
an institutional perspective, these features of property law call for a
dominant role for the legislative, administrative, and judicial
branches in devising the list of recognized property rights,
establishing formalities for their validation (e.g., through
registration), and setting the ranking of property interests in case of
conflicting claims.
This Article shows how the challenge of devising a workable
property system becomes much more onerous, both qualitatively and
quantitatively, in the cross-border context. From an institutional
perspective, the in rem feature of property requires a cross-border
legal ordering by an array of domestic and supranational institutions:
legislative, administrative, and adjudicative. This is especially so
because unlike cross-border disputes that apply only among
contractual parties, the in rem feature of property law places
practical limits on the ability to engage in private ordering, such as
through a contractual dispute resolution clause, to circumvent
1. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 777 (2001) (distinguishing in rem property rights from in
personam contract rights).
2. AMNON LEHAVI, THE CONSTRUCTION OF PROPERTY: NORMS, INSTITUTIONS,
CHALLENGES 39-41 (2013).
3. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization i  the
Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 60-66 (2000)
(summarizing the consequences of legislatures creating the law of property).
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potential problems of legal uncertainty or other types of incongruence
of norms across national borders.
At present, the framework of supranational institutions dealing
with property law is fragmented and incomplete, and this in turn
entails challenges for the ability of top-down or bottom-up actors to
move closer to global legal ordering in various contexts of property
law.
This Article argues that the need for establishing and operating
supranational institutions, whether legislative, administrative, or
judicial, depends on the specific globalization strategy chosen in a
certain property context. Whereas "soft law" instruments do not
require binding supranational institutions, the need for such
institutions proves critical for more ambitious strategies for
globalization. The Article identifies three types of "hard law"
strategies for the globalization of property law, shows how each such
strategy currently relies on a certain set of institutions, and
demonstrates how a fuller realization of each such strategy may call
for better institutions.
The three "hard law" strategies for globalization analyzed in the
context of property law are as follows: (1) conflict of laws strategy,
which aims at improving certainty about the national forum that
would have jurisdiction and the law that would apply, while leaving
the mainstay of property ordering to the respective domestic systems;
(2) approximation strategy, usually promoted through treaties or
conventions that introduce "minimum standards of protection" in a
certain field of law (most prominently in intellectual property), while
leaving to states and their courts the chief power of lawmaking and
enforcement of such norms; and (3) supranationalism strategy, which
establishes norms that explicitly enjoy some type of a superior legal
status over national norms in case of conflict. Leading examples of
the supranationalism strategy are property clauses in binding human
rights treaties, such as Article 1 of the First Protocol of the European
Convention of Human Rights.4
The need for comprehensive and effective supranational
institutions is positively correlated with the substantive scope of a
certain strategy for promoting cross-border norms. Accordingly, a soft
law instrument or a conflict of laws strategy may settle for relatively
modest supranational institutions. In contrast, the establishment of
binding supranational institutions may prove critical for the
approximation strategy, and even more so for the supranationalism
strategy. The Article identifies the current gaps in the institutional
context and examines future paths for progress.
4. See Protocol to the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 1, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262.
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This Article is structured as follows. Part II demonstrates the
complete nature of domestic legal institutions. It shows how in well-
functioning states, legal systems include generally acceptable and
comprehensive rules that cover the: (1) authority of institutions for
lawmaking and enforcement; (2) capability of complete coverage, such
that no issue worthy of legal ordering would remain in a vacuum,
with no institution authorized to act in the matter; and (3) resolution
of potential conflicts among governmental institutions (e.g.,
legislature vs. judiciary).
Part III shows that unlike nation-states, the international
setting is largely lacking in all of the abovementioned institutional
aspects. These gaps pose a significant challenge for property law in
moving from the domestic level to effective global governance. This
Part highlights the interface of sovereignty and institutional capacity
in the international arena; the interplay between bottom-up and top-
down forces in driving cross-border activities that implicate property
law; and the unique features of property law that require both
institutional completeness and normative coherence.
Part IV outlines the web of supranational institutions that
currently impact property law, based on the taxonomy of the
strategies for globalization set out above: soft law instruments,
conflict of laws strategy, approximation strategy, and
supranationalism strategy. It examines the growing role of
supranational tribunal and courts, but also the limited jurisdiction
that such judicial institutions have, especially in the context of
property disputes between private parties. It underscores global
administrative mechanisms that have been developed over the past
few years, including a global registry for mobile aircraft equipment
and regional patent registries. The biggest challenge remains in
regard to global legislative institutions. Relying on theme-specific
supranational conventions, property law falls significantly short of
global legislative ordering. This is so because the international
setting lacks a supranational legislature with comprehensive
authority to craft the entire array of in rem property interests,
implicating both public law and private law aspects. These types of
institutional gaps vividly illustrate the persisting impediments to
moving toward an effective global governance of property rights.
II. THE COMPLETE NATURE OF DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS
Under well-established rules of international law, one of the
inherent features of a state is the existence of an effective
2017] 1177
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"government."5 This term should be understood as going beyond the
ability to identify some sort of a sovereign power that is generally
recognized by persons located inside the state's territory and by other
states outside of it. Securing a "general habit of obedience"6 to a
person or collective body identified as the sovereign is the first step in
moving away from an anarchic state of nature, but it must be
complemented by establishing an orderly system of government. For
a state to properly function, it needs to have a complete set of
institutions that are formally authorized and practically capable of
making, administering, and enforcing an entire set of legal norms
that would apply within the state's territory.
Scholarly accounts of legal systems have traditionally sought to
identify the types of fundamental legal norms that define a legal
system, but they have also realized that such rules cannot be
detached from the institutions that make and enforce them. Hans
Kelsen focused on the hierarchy of norms in a legal system by
identifying the "basic norm" (Grundnorm) as the ultimate
authoritative source that legitimizes subsequent lawmaking and on
which the "validity of all the norms of our legal systems depends."7
Such a basic norm does not hinge, however, on possessing some sort
of moral superiority or other substantive virtue. It may be simply the
result of identifying the first link in a chain of norms or authoritative
acts. The basic norm may come down to the postulation by which "one
ought to behave as the individual, or the individuals, who laid down
the first constitution have ordained."8 Thus, the fundamental
features of a legal system rely on identifying not only certain core
norms, but also the institutions that crafted those norms.
H.L.A. Hart mapped the varieties of rules that typify a legal
system.9 Alongside primary rules that impose certain obligations or
duties on norm-bearers (associated with John Austin's view of legal
norms as orders backed by threats),'0 legal systems also include types
5. See Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26,
1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 U.N.T.S. 19 (Under Article 1, the other features of the state
are a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the capacity to
enter into relations with the other states).
6. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 23-24 (2d ed. 1994) (identifying the
general traits of a sovereign power based on the works of British legal theorist John
Austin).
7. HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 115 (Anders Wedberg
trans., 1945).
8. Id.
9. HART, supra note 6.
10. See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 199-
200 (1832) (noting that one of the distinguishing features of sovereignty is that "the
bulk of the given society are in a habit of obedience or submission to a determinate and
common superior: let that common superior be a certain individual person, or a certain
body or aggregate of individual persons").
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of secondary norms that are essential for their operation." One such
set of norms concerns "power-conferring rules," which grant persons
certain powers to "mould their legal relations with others by
contracts, wills, marriages," and so forth.12 Another set of norms
includes "rules of recognition," which help to identify the types of
norms considered legally valid and included, therefore, as items in
the "authoritative list of rules."'3 The identifying criteria under such
rules of recognition for viewing certain norms as legally binding may
include, inter alia, "the fact of their having been enacted by a specific
body."1 4 Finally, "rules of change" empower "an individual or body of
persons to introduce new primary rules for the conduct of the life of
the group."15 The variety of secondary norms identified by Hart thus
emphasizes the essential role of institutions in a legal system and
shows how the identity of a certain institution may implicate the
validity of substantive norms.
It is furthermore essential to distinguish between the identity
and authority of the sovereign in a certain state and the formal
capacity of institutions in charge of lawmaking and enforcement. This
distinction is especially essential in view of the growing dominance,
at least among democratic societies, of the idea of popular
sovereignty, by which the People at large or the electorate body of
citizens is considered to be the ultimate sovereign within the state.'6
The capacity for lawmaking thus hinges on the authority granted by
the sovereign, explicitly or implicitly, not only to elected
institutions-particularly the legislature-but also to nonelected
branches of government, most notably courts, administrative
agencies, and other public officials.
As Hart notes, according to this perspective on sovereignty, "the
difference between a legal system in which the ordinary legislature is
free from legal limitations, and one where the legislature is subject to
them, appears merely as the difference between the manner [sic] in
which the sovereign electorate chooses to exercise its sovereign
powers."'7 Thus, the lesser limits imposed on the British Parliament
in its lawmaking capacity as compared with the US Congress-which
is constrained both by the limits of federalism and the superior status
11. HART, supra note 6, at 79 (portraying Austin's theory as insufficient to
account for the variety of legal norms).
12. Id. at 27-28.
13. Id. at 94-99.
14. Id. at 95.
15. Id.
16. See Kenneth Anderson, Through our Glass Darkly: Does Comparative Law
Counsel the Use of Foreign Law in U.S. Constitutional Adjudication?, 52 DUQ. L. REV.
115, 122-25 (2014) (asserting that popular sovereignty is the U.S. Constitution's source
of legitimacy).
17. HART, supra note 6 at 74.
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of the US Constitution over regular lawmaking-can be attributed to
the different scope of authority granted by the sovereign electorate to
the various types of institutions operating within the legal system.18
In a representative democracy, the fact that the People or the
electorate body is identified as the "sovereign free from all legal
limitations" tells only part of the story about how the system of
governance and its legal system operate. It is the way in which a
lawmaking power is transferred from the sovereign to various
governmental institutions that truly defines a state's legal system.
For a state and its legal system to function properly, one needs to
identify the: (1) authority of each institution to make, revise, or
enforce legally binding norms; (2) capability of the state's institutions
as a whole of complete coverage of all themes considered to be ones
that should be governed by legal norms or authoritative acts; and (3)
interinstitutional allocation of power, including resolution of conflicts
or other frictions among such institutions. This latter component may
require elements of hierarchy within the same governmental branch,
such as the capacity of a court of appeals to review and overturn
decisions made by courts of first instance,19 or the decision-making
hierarchy that exists within the executive branch.20 Moreover, any
legal system must have rules on the potential hierarchy, or any other
type of resolution mechanism for potential conflicts, among different
branches of government. These mechanisms may obviously be very
controversial at times, both legally and politically, with judicial
review of legislative acts being a particularly contested issue.21
Federal systems also exhibit tensions between state and federal
institutions.22 Difficult as these issues may be, every legal system
must establish a set of rules for resolving potential frictions among
governmental branches about lawmaking powers.
To sum up, in well-functioning states, a legal system must
include generally acceptable and comprehensive rules that cover the:
(1) authority of institutions for lawmaking and enforcement; (2)
capability of complete coverage, such that no issue worthy of legal
ordering would remain in a vacuum, with no institution authorized to
18. Id.
19. See P.S. ATIYAH & R.H SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-
AMERICAN LAW 267-97 (1987) (discussing the respective roles of lower and upper
courts in the Anglo-American system).
20. See Kevin M. Stack, An Administrative Jurisprudence: The Rule of Law in
the Administrative State, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1985, 1994-2002 (2015) (explaining how
to specify general rule-of-law principles in the context of administrative governance).
21. See JOHN H. MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PEREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW
TRADITION 137-40 (3d ed. 2007) (examining the concept of judicial review across civil
law systems); Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 CAL.
L. REV. 519 passim (2012).
22. See GEORGE ANDERSON, FEDERALISM: AN INTRODUCTION 21-29 (2008).
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act in the matter; and (3) resolution of potential conflicts among
governmental institutions. When this is the case, one can speak of the
state's domestic institutions as being authorized, complete, and
coordinated among themselves.23
III. THE GLOBAL SETTING: INCOMPLETE INSTITUTIONS AND
NORMATIVE FRAGMENTATION
Unlike individual states, the international setting is largely
lacking in all three institutional parameters that were identified in
Part II, namely: (1) authority to act on an international scale; (2)
capability of complete coverage of all legal norms that are relevant for
cross-border legal ordering; and (3) interinstitutional mechanisms for
resolving potential conflicts both between international and domestic
institutions and among different types of supranational institutions.
These gaps, generally dubbed here as problems of "incomplete
institutions" and "normative fragmentation," pose a significant
challenge for the ability of any field of law, and property law in
particular, to move from the domestic level to an effective global
governance of property law.
As Part IV will show, the potential implications of these
institutional deficiencies hinge on the type of "hard law" strategy that
is adopted to handle a certain cross-border aspect of property law. A
conflict of laws strategy is generally the most modest in its need for
establishing supranational institutions, because it relies on states
agreeing only about the authorized national forum and the law that
would apply. Once this choice has been made, domestic institutions
will engage in lawmaking and its enforcement. An approximation
strategy requires a more extensive array of international institutions,
which would establish the scope and content of the norms that would
then serve as a benchmark for state lawmakers tasked with adjusting
their local laws. The supranationalism strategy calls for the most
comprehensive set of institutions and lawmaking on . the
supranational level, because by its nature, it relies on the
preeminence of such norms for lawmaking, administration of the
laws, and their adjudicative interpretation and enforcement. Part IV
will map out the institutional landscape, and the deficiencies of the
current state of incomplete institutions and normative fragmentation,
based on these strategies for globalization.
23. See ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND FUNCTION IN A LEGAL SYSTEM: A
GENERAL STUDY 307-08 (2006) (identifying how "second-level systematizing devices"
unify diverse institutions "into the coherent whole of an operational legal system"
based on ideas such as hierarchy, priorital relations, coordination, and so forth).
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Prior to doing so, this Part highlights a few essential points
concerning the: (a) interface of sovereignty and institutional capacity
in the international arena; (b) interplay between bottom-up and top-
down forces in driving cross-border activities that implicate property
law; and (c) unique features of property law that require both
institutional completeness and normative coherence.
A. Sovereignty and Institutions: An International Perspective
Under the conventional account of international law, it is a body
of law that exists "between states recognizing common principles and
ways of doing things."24 Unlike the hierarchal or otherwise-
coordinated structure of domestic institutions and norms, the
international system is viewed in principle as horizontal, meaning
that all states are sovereign and equal, and no entity has superior
authority over them. This means, therefore, that there is no such
thing as global or supranational sovereignty that, by definition,
supersedes the sovereignty of individual states. 25
That said, the mechanisms of international law do establish
institutions and norms with an international validity, or some sort of
a supranational reach, binding more than one country.
Treaty-based international law is the chief mechanism by which
both institutions and norms are established and are binding on states
that have approved and ratified the treaty.26 As such, however, these
sources of law do not bind states that have not joined the treaty, or
states that decide to retract their membership in the treaty at a later
stage.2 7 As Part IV will show, many treaties not only devise norms
that apply to a certain cross-border matter, but also establish
institutions in charge of consequent lawmaking and enforcement. The
supranational institutions thus become authorized to act and bind
states by virtue of the treaty.
The other main source of international law (i.e., custom) refers
to certain practices and other forms of conduct that have been broadly
accepted by states over time and which can be attributed to a sense of
legal obligation-known as opinio juris (acceptance of law)-that
states feel toward abiding by such a norm.28 While such a customary
norm, once identified, can be attributed in principle to all states
across the globe, it is also more limited in the sense that by its
customary nature, it does not in itself establish institutions
authorized to enforce such customary norms, and it might also not
24. MALCoLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-5 (7th ed. 2014).
25. See id.
26. See id. at 66-68.
27. JAN KLABBERS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 41-43 (2013).
28. Id. at 28-30.
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apply to states that have persistently objected to applying such a
custom.2 9 The custom's enforcement would have to rely either on
domestic institutions, such as local courts, reaffirming the custom, or
on pre-existing supranational institutions, formed by a past treaty,
whose authority is viewed as extending to apply and enforce
customary international law.
The key lesson that should be derived about the interface
between sovereignty and lawmaking institutions in the international
setting is that the general concept of sovereignty does relatively little
work in explaining the scope of international law when it is viewed in
isolation from the institutional perspective. In the domestic setting,
the sovereign entity-the People or electorate body-has effective
channels, such as general elections or referenda to directly decide
normative matters, if needed. The sovereign electorate in a state can
thus resolve potential conflicts among government entities, and
ensure that there is no legal vacuum because no institution has the
capacity to act. In contrast, in the international or supranational
arena, there is no global or supranational sovereign electorate that
can act directly. This means that cross-border legal ordering will
simply not exist without clearly authorized institutions and a
normative framework that is both coherent and comprehensive
enough.
B. Top-Down and Bottom-Up Institutions
Processes of globalization may be driven by top-down forces, i.e.,
states working together to promote a certain cross-border agenda.
Alternatively, such processes can be led by bottom-up drivers, such as
corporations or individuals engaging in cross-border market activity,
development of technology, interpersonal networks, and so forth. In
some cases, these two types of forces may work in the same direction
(e.g., when states promote free trade measures that follow up on
decentralized cross-border trade). In other cases, these forces may
work at cross-purposes, such as when states impose trade barriers
that undermine commerce.30
The identity of the driving force for a certain process of
globalization has clear institutional implications for the legal
29. For more about the long-standing debate in international law about the
"persistent objector rule" as exempting states from abiding by norms that have been
otherwise identified as being part of customary international law, see COMM. ON
FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY (GEN.) INT'L L., INT'L L. ASS'N, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES
APPLICABLE TO THE FORMATION OF GENERAL CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 27-29
(2000), https://ruwanthikagunaratne.files.wordpress.com/2011/04/ila-customary-law-
study.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZBM4-8N9J] (archived Sept. 29, 2017).
30. See Amnon Lehavi, Unbundling Harmonization: Public versus Private Law
Strategies to Globalize Property, 15 CHI. J. INT'L L. 452, 459-62 (2015).
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ordering of such a process. When states collaborate to facilitate the
movement of capital, goods, services, or persons, or to otherwise
promote some type of cross-border activity, they are likely to create a
top-down institutional arrangement, especially if the scheme is based
on an approximation strategy or a supranationalism strategy. For
example, the World Trade Organization (WTO) deals with the rules of
trade between nations. It is a "rules-based, member-driven
organization-all decisions are made by the member governments,
and the rules are the outcome of negotiations among governments."3 1
The institutional structure of the WTO and its dispute settlement
mechanism are clearly typified by a top-down approach, wherein
member states both make trade policy and take part in the dispute
settlement process through an array of international institutions.32
Oppositely, when a process of globalization is driven largely by
an aggregation of decentralized actions taken by individuals and
corporations, these forces have to rely at the outset on private
ordering mechanisms, mostly through contracts and other types of
bottom-up mechanisms for interpersonal coordination. Gunther
Teubner points to the spontaneous, grassroots development of a new
body of law that "emerges from various globalization processes in
multiple. sectors of civil society independently of the laws of the
nation states."3 3 Teubner notes in particular the emergence of the
contemporary lex mercatoria-the transnational law of economic
transactions-alongside other practices of private global norm
production, including the internal legal regimes of multinational
corporations, private lawmaking by labor unions, technical
standardization, internet arrangements, and international rules on
sports.3 4 A notable international institution that is privately
organized is the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), which
seeks to promote "international trade, services and investment."35
While the ICC has no general binding force on states or individuals,
its professional prominence often leads contractual parties to adopt
terms of reference crafted by it, and in many cases parties agree to
arbitrate contractual disputes before the ICC's International Court of
31. The WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/
thewto-e.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2017) [https://perma.cclP6QQ-MRLM] (archived Sept.
29, 2017).
32. See infra Part IV.C.1.
33. Gunther Teubner, 'Global Bukowina': Legal Pluralism in the World
Society, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3-4 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997).
34. See Gunther Teubner, Breaking Frames: The Global Interplay of Legal and
Social Systems, 45 AM. J. CoMP. L. 149, 156-59 (1997).
35. SABINO CASSESE, THE GLOBAL POLITY 19 (2012),
http://es.globallawpress.org/wp-content/uploads/02-TheGlobalPolity.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E8BA-MGH8] (archived Oct. 8, 2017) (quoting the preamble of the
ICC Constitution).
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Arbitration.3 6 Therefore, while there is debate about whether one can
truly identify a comprehensive contemporary lex mercatoria that
allows merchants to bridge gaps created by national norms,37
privately organized institutions, such as the ICC, definitely capture a
growing role in the international arena.38
However, these bottom-up institutions have their limits,
especially in the context of property law. Contractual parties,
including those located across borders, can engage in private ordering
if they are displeased with the general laws of contracts in their
respective countries or with the default conflict of laws rules
governing international contacts. In so doing, parties can resort to
privately organized international institutions, such as the ICC, not
only by adopting their terms of reference in drafting the contract, but
moreover by resolving potential disputes before its court of
arbitration, while agreeing on the substantive and procedural rules
that would apply. But such an agreement, and the subsequent work
of institutions such as the ICC in implementing the parties'
contractual freedom, is generally binding only on these parties. The
lawmaking and adjudication capacities of such institutions do not
generally bind third parties, which may have competing legal claims
or causes of action, and that have not been party to the agreement
about the underlying contract or the mechanisms for dispute
resolution. As Part III.C below highlights, the structure of property
law is different, particularly because it purports to set up legal
priorities and ranking of property interests that have an in rem
effect. As such, property law also orders legal relations among parties
that have no contractual privity or other preset mechanism for
private ordering. This feature of property law places a limit on the
power of bottom-up institutions that derive their authority from the
explicit consent of the parties. To bind also parties that have not
engaged in such private ordering, institutions must derive their
authority from the coercive and general legal power of top-down
institutions. What this means in the international context is that the
power to legislate broadly binding property norms and to resolve
conflicts with an in rem effect is vested in institutions that derive
their authority from the conventional sources of international law.
This refers mostly to top-down institutions authorized by
international treaties.
36. Dispute Resolution, INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
http://www.iccwbo.org/about-icc/organization/dispute-resolution-services/ice-
international-court-of-arbitration/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2017) [https://perma.cclR8A5-
BTSS] (archived Sept. 28, 2017).
37. See GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 556 (2001). For
a historical discussion of merchant law, see Emily Kadens, Myth of the Customary Law
Merchant, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1153 (2012).
38. See CASSESE, supra note 35.
2017] 1185
VANDERBILT]OURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
C. In Rem Effect of Property Law: Institutional Implications
Due to the considerable disparities between the substantive and
procedural property norms of different nations-including the list and
content of the numerus clausus of property rights in each system-
attempts at facilitating some level of globalization cannot settle for
bottom-up institutions for lawmaking and enforcement.3 9 The cross-
border ordering of property requires at least some kind of an
interstate agreement about the identity and authority of legal
institutions.
Moreover, due to the in rem feature of property rights, and the
respective need for sufficient clarity, comprehensiveness, and
predictability of property rights, the field'of property law calls for a
considerable degree of legislative lawmaking, even in traditionally
common law systems.40 The role of legislative institutions is no less
crucial in the international setting, where the need to bridge
disparities requires a coordinated effort to provide a comprehensive
set of rules, whether providing for joint rules on jurisdiction and
applicable law in cross-border settings (conflict of laws strategy), a
minimal level of similarity among national systems (approximation
strategy), or direct establishment of supranational binding norms
(supranationalism strategy). At the same time, the subjection of state
lawmaking powers to a supranational authority may be particularly
sensitive due to the specific association of legislatures with national
sovereignty.
Alongside legislative institutions, cross-border property law,
under any of the strategies for globalization, requires significant
collaboration among executive or administrative agencies and at
times also the establishment of an interstate executive body. This is
particularly so when a cross-border activity requires the registration,
administration, or regulation of property interests. This is
demonstrated, for example, in Part IV.D.6, which deals with the
international registration of security interests in mobile aircraft
equipment.
Finally, any cross-border property regime requires adjudicative
institutions, such as courts or tribunals, with authority and practical
ability to decide property disputes, while also considering, in
appropriate cases, the potential property interests of third parties
beyond the litigating parties. As with other types of institutions, the
appropriate level (state or supranational) and nature of adjudicative
institutions hinge on the type of strategy chosen for globalizing
property norms. A conflict of laws strategy focuses on national courts.
39. See Lehavi, supra note 30 at 480-83.
40. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 3.
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An approximation strategy and, moreover, a supranationalism
strategy require some type of a cross-border adjudicative institution,
whether it is operating alongside domestic courts or is explicitly
authorized to preempt national case law. This breakdown of
adjudicative institutions will be featured throughout Part IV below.
A final note about the general institutional implications of the in
rem nature of property law has to do with the interface between
private law and public law aspects. Property law deals both with
public law issues (such as the scope of permissible governmental
intervention with private property rights) and with private law issues
(having to do with the entire array of interpersonal legal relations in
regard to assets).41 Domestic legal institutions generally address both
aspects, even if in diverging settings or by distinctive institutions, so
that there are normally no legal vacuums and no lack of institutions
authorized to act on both fronts.
The situation may be different, however, in the international
arena. Because the authority of cross-border institutions-be they
legislative, administrative, or adjudicative-hinges on identifying an
underlying source, the result can be one in which legal norms and
respective institutions deal with only one aspect (public or private) of
a property law issue. As the next Part shows, this deficiency may at
times lead to normative fragmentation and incomplete institutions,
which could be detrimental to designing property norms with in rem
validity in a global context.
IV. INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF CROSS-BORDER PROPERTY NORMS
This Part offers an institutional analysis of the current
landscape of cross-border property norms. The delineation of these
norms is based on the different strategies for globalization, starting
with soft law strategies, such as model laws, and then moving to the
hard law ones: conflict of laws strategy, approximation strategy, and
supranationalism strategy.4 2 The main argument cutting through the
analysis is that the type of strategy chosen for a certain theme in
property law should be correlated with the level (local or
supranational) and scope of authority of the institutions tasked with
making, administering, and enforcing the norms. A conflict of laws
strategy generally requires a treaty that establishes rules on
jurisdiction and applicable law, but otherwise relies on domestic
judicial institutions. An approximation strategy necessitates a treaty
or convention, which establishes the substantive and procedural
41. LEHAVI, supra note 2, at 43-45.
42. See infra Part I.
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norms that need to be equated or approximated. Administration of
these norms would usually be carried out by local institutions.
Judicial interpretation and interstate dispute resolution of the treaty
might require a supranational court or tribunal, while adjudication
among private parties would usually be done by local courts. Finally,
a supranationalism strategy would usually require granting some
sort of preemptive authority to various types of supranational
institutions-legislative, administrative, or judicial-while
establishing the general allocation of powers among local and
supranational institutions.
A. Soft Law Instruments
While most of the focus of this Part lies in identifying "hard law"
norms and the institutions that make and enforce them, it is also
essential to underscore the significant role of "soft law" or private
ordering mechanisms in the promotion of cross-border property
norms and practices.4 3
Although such norms are not directly binding on states, soft law
or private ordering mechanisms can practically influence the ways in
which both states and private actors across borders design and
administer arrangements that pertain to property law. The following
subparts discuss the work of some top-down and bottom-up
institutions in this context.
1. Declarative International Instruments
One of the most prominent institutions that promote soft law
mechanisms, touching also on property law, is the quintessential top-
down international institution: the United Nations and its various
agencies. Part IIV.A.2 below will discuss some of the work done by UN
agencies in drafting model laws, legislative guides, and practice
guides, which are then offered as a model for the different nations of
the world. But to start with, it is worth considering the role of the UN
General Assembly in adopting a number of nonbinding declarations
or resolutions that have a bearing on property law, and which in some
cases have influenced property law concepts in various national legal
systems. In this sense, these UN declarative instruments can be seen
as soft law mechanisms, which nevertheless have had an impact on
the global legal landscape.
43. For the general distinction between 'hard law' and 'soft law' in the
international setting, see Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in
International Governance, 54 INTL ORG. 421, 421-24 (2000).
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The most prominent example is the 1948 Universal Declaration
of Human Rights.44 Article 17 reads: "(1) Everyone has the right to
own property alone as well as in association with others; (2) No one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property."45 As with all other
rights included in the Declaration, the right to property is subject to
the provision of Article 29(2) that enables states to limit the right to
property in order to respect the rights and freedoms of others or to
promote "just requirements of morality, public order and the general
welfare in a democratic society."46
This somewhat exceptional conception of property, which
includes not only private property, but also property held "in
association with others," can be attributed to pressures levied by the
Soviet Union and its allies prior to adopting the Declaration.4 7 The
same kind of resistance to recognizing the special status of private
property led the Soviet bloc to veto later attempts to enshrine the
right to property in international instruments, such as in the 1966
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights4 8
and in the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.4 9 Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
has therefore remained as part of a declaratory instrument, which
was not followed by subsequent binding international treaties. As
such, the special status of the right to property remains a matter of
soft law on the universal scale.
That said, Article 17 has proven to be significant, at least in the
sense that it was embraced by various courts around the world for
giving content to the right to property on the domestic level. Although
courts around the world stress that the Declaration in general has no
binding force, some national courts-such as those of India or Sri
Lanka-do resort to the various provisions of the Declaration as a
tool for interpretation of domestic constitutional provisions.5 0 Some
scholars go further to argue that the provisions of Article 17 in
44. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10,
1948).
45. Id. art. 17.
46. Id. art. 29(2).
47. See JOHN G. SPRANKLING, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PROPERTY 10
(2014).
48. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (Dec. 16, 1966).
49. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (Dec. 16, 1966).
50. See Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights in National and International Law III: The Status of Future of the Customary
International Law of Human Rights, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 287, 299-300 (1995).
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particular are now part of international customary law, albeit on a
limited scale, and although this right is not universally recognized.5 '
Another declarative international instrument that has gained
some prominence and which touches on property law is the 2007 UN
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.5 2 Article 26 of the
Declaration refers specifically to the protection of property interests,
by providing, inter alia, that "indigenous peoples have the right to the
lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned,
occupied or otherwise used or acquired."5 3 It further calls on states to
"give legal recognition to these lands, territories, and resources."54
The Declaration on Indigenous Peoples initially received a cool
reception from countries that might be particularly affected by the
call to actively validate customary interests. Canada initially rejected
the Declaration by arguing that the provisions were "overly broad"
and "not balanced" in that they suggested that "indigenous rights
prevail over the rights of others."5 5 Later, however, Canada reframed
its position by supporting the Declaration, with the understanding
that its provisions were vague enough to allow for various
interpretations. The vagueness of the provisions, alongside the soft
law nature of the Declaration, therefore, allowed states such as
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand to somehow get along with the
Declaration. The Declaration currently serves mostly as a symbolic
international instrument, and as such, it proves particularly
dominant in political campaigns launched by various indigenous and
tribal groups around the world, without formally binding the property
laws of the respective states.5 6
2. Collaboration on Best Practices, Guidelines, and Model Laws
Numerous international institutions, including UN Agencies and
other interstate entities, engage in collaboration and coordination
with the purpose of promoting "best practices," guidelines, or
suggested blueprints for domestic law and regulation, including in
matters dealing with property law. Therefore, while these
international institutions are essentially top-down organizations, the
51. See id. at 347 (citing Luis Valencia Rodriguez, The Right of Everyone to
Own Property Alone as Well as in Association with Others, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/15
(Dec. 15, 1992)).
52. G.A. Res. 61/295, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Sept.
13, 2007).
53. Id. art. 26(1).
54. Id. art. 26(2).
55. Seth J. Frantzman, Havatzelet Yahel & Ruth Kark, Contested Indigeneity:
The Development of an Indigenous Discourse on the Bedouin of the Negev, Israel, 17
IsR. STUD. 78, 83 (2012).
56. See id. at 80-81.
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products of their labor are soft law measures that do not immediately
bind states or any of their governance organs. At the same time, these
suggested guidelines or model laws are not entirely powerless. This is
so, for example, because the adoption of such measures by a
particular state may confer concrete benefits to it, such as when
financial support granted by bodies like the World Bank or the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) is explicitly or implicitly
conditioned on reforming domestic systems, based on such model laws
or guidelines.5 7
The following paragraphs highlight the work of some of these
international institutions in promoting "best practice" mechanisms,
guidelines, and model laws in matters pertaining to property law. The
list of institutions and depiction of their work are obviously non-
exhaustive.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, an international
institution tasked with overseeing banks and other significant
financial institutions, is one of the most prominent intergovernmental
entities in charge of setting professional standards.5 8 The Basel
Committee's suggested practices operate initially as soft law, but may
then be embraced by states, via their central banks, as binding
domestic policy. Created in the mid-1970s, in the aftermath of several
cross-border crises involving the banking industry, the Basel
Committee currently comprises members of G-20 countries, but its
professional standards also resonate among, and are often embraced
by, non-member states.59 In so doing, the Basel Committee also sets
the tone for other international institutions engaged in standard-
setting, such as the International Organization of Securities
Commissions,60 and the International Association of Insurance
Supervisors.61
From its inception, the Basel Committee has been occupied not
only with promoting general "best practices" across the banking
industry, but also with controlling the potential cross-border effects of
inadequate standards, such as when the failure of local branches of
57. See generally, Poonam Gupta et al., Legal and Judicial Reform in Europe
and Central Asia (World Bank Operations Evaluation Dep't, Working Paper No. 27811,
2002).
58. About the Basel Committee, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS,
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/about.htm (last updated Aug. 10, 2017) [https://perma.ccfYBZ4-
9MW8] (archived Sept. 29, 2017).
59. CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 77-78
(2015).
60. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS,
https://www.iosco.org/about/?subsection=aboutjiosco (last visited Oct. 8, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/E5FB-3WYT] (archived Oct. 4, 2017).
61. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE SUPERVISORS,
http://www.iaisweb.org/home (last visited Oct. 8, 2017) [https://perma.ce/M45P-FDRA]
(archived Oct. 4, 2017).
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foreign banks impacts the relevant domestic market.62 Accordingly,
the capital adequacy requirements adopted in the 1988 Basel I
Accord,63 and revised in subsequent accords, were driven to a large
extent by concerns over the arbitrage or differences in regulatory
approaches across national boundaries.64 Furthermore, more recent
accords have sought o close the gaps that still existed in the Basel I
Accord, particularly about the criteria for assessing risks. Capital
reforms under the Basel I165 and Basel III66 frameworks seek to more
closely coordinate the standards for capital adequacy.67
A recent measure taken by the Basel Committee, which has a
direct bearing on property law, is the revised Basel III document on
"Revisions to the Securitisation Framework" published in July
2016.68 Securitization, the process by which loans or other claims to
monetary rewards are bundled, packaged, and sold off to investors,
played a major role in the subprime lending fiasco, which led to a
global financial crisis.6 9 The process of removing risk from the
original borrowers, and creating different tranches of securities and
derivatives generated from bundled loans, allowed securities market
speculators to collude with credit-rating agencies in selling high-risk
securities to dispersed and practically ignorant investors across the
globe. When interest rates began to rise in 2006-2007, and house
values fell below outstanding balances on home mortgages, the chain
reaction of overexposure to risk quickly unfolded across borders.70
Further, the over-fragmentation of property interests among the
various stockholders made it extremely difficult to restructure the
underlying debts so as to decrease the devastating effects of the
massive foreclosure of underwater assets.7 i Therefore, the need to
monitor against the hazards of irresponsible securitization of
mortgage-backed assets concerns not only the. financial risk of steep
62. BRUMMER, supra note 59, at 77.
63. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE
OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENTS AND STANDARDS (1988), www.bis.org/publ/bcbsci11.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5EK2-44SV] (archived Oct. 8, 2017).
64. BRUMMER, supra note 59, at 235.
65. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE
OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENTS AND STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK (2004),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.pdf [https://perma.cc/T2MG-WKPG] (archived Oct. 8,
2017).
66. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III DOCUMENT: REVISIONS
TO THE SECURITISATION FRAMEWORK (2016), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d374.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZD5G-5TJ3] (archived Oct. 8, 2017).
67. BRUMMER, supra note 59, at 243-45.
68. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III DOCUMENT, supra
note 66.
69. BRUMMER, supra note 59, at 219-21.
70. Id.
71. See David Dana, The Foreclosure Crisis and the Anti-Fragmentation
Principle in State Property Law, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 97, 98 (2010).
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decreases in the price of securities across global markets, but also the
legal risk of inefficient over-fragmentation of the property regime
that governs the underlying assets.
The Basel III framework for assessing risks, establishing credit
ratings, and constructing the hierarchy of entitlements thus serves
the important goal of decreasing the regulatory arbitrage among
different national systems-dealing with both property and securities
regulation aspects. While the work of the Basel Committee is
principally a soft law mechanism, the Committee's prominence
creates an effective mechanism that decreases the risks of
uncontrolled cross-border securities trade and allows for the
development of shared property concepts about securitization.
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), a permanent intergovernmental body established by the
UN General Assembly in 1964, is a prominent body in advancing soft
law mechanisms tying economic development and international
investment.72 These instruments have a direct bearing on property
law on both the national and supranational levels. This is so because
the suggested blueprints for law and regulation concerning economic
development may incentivize countries to reform their property law,
and land law in particular, especially when UNCTAD's financial
support is somehow conditioned on such a legal reform.73 Moreover,
international investment, by its nature, has a cross-border effect on
property law, especially when investors seek, via an International
Investment Agreement (IIA), to protect their property rights beyond
the application of the "national treatment" standard by the host
country.74
A recent example for such a soft law instrument designed by
UNCTAD is the 2015 Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable
Development.7 5 It is aimed at serving as a "point of reference for
policymakers in formulating national investment policies, in
negotiating or reviewing IAs, and in designing concrete policy
initiatives to promote investment in priority sectors for sustainable
72. About UNCTAD, UNITED NATIONS CONF. ON TRADE AND DEV.,
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/aboutus.aspx (last visited Oct. 8, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/Q2LY-RQU7] (archived Oct. 4, 2017).
73. See Projects, UNITED NATIONS CONF. ON TRADE AND DEV.,
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/technicalcooperation.aspx (last visited Oct. 8, 2017)
[https://perma.cclN9TH-LRE5] (archived Oct. 4, 2017) (tying assistance from UNCTAD
to approved development projects).
74. See infra Part IV.D.4 (discussing the property effects of BITs).
75. See generally, UNITED NATIONS CONF. ON TRADE AND DEV., INVESTMENT
POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2015),
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/INVESTMENT%20POLICY
%20FRAMEWORK%202015%20WEBVERSION.pdf [https://perma.cc/3QLY-C6QT
(archived Oct. 4, 2017).
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development."7 6 This document identifies, inter alia, strategic and
normative goals that states should pursue in promoting investment,
balancing state commitments to investors with maintaining the
state's regulatory space for development, and launching regional
initiatives to promote sustainability-driven investment, especially for
cross-border infrastructure development and regional clusters of
sector-specific firms.7 7 This soft law mechanism thus seeks to shore
up national property laws to promote UNCTAD's goal of sustainable
development and to alleviate property-related tensions over cross-
border investment.
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL), another UN-based intergovernmental institution,
concerns itself with the "modernization and harmonization of rules on
international business."7 8 UNCITRAL drafts convention texts, model
laws, legislative guides, and practice guides in various legal fields
touching on commercial law, with the purpose of enhancing interstate
coordination and streamlining international trade and investment.7 9
Therefore, alongside the facilitation of hard law instruments, such as
the 1980 UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods8 o or the 1988 UN Convention on International Bills of
Exchange and International Promissory Notes,81 UNCITRAL has
proven to be a key institution in promoting soft law mechanisms,
including in the context of property law.
A prominent soft law mechanism dealing with property law is
the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law. Published in
three parts, between 2004 and 2013,82 this legislative guide is
76. Id. at 6.
77. Id. at 4-6.
78. About UNCITRAL, UNITED NATIONS COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitrallen/about-us.htm1 (last visited Oct. 8, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/5QF2-G9HT] (archived Oct. 4, 2017).
79. See generally UNITED NATIONS COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW, A GUIDE TO
UNCITRAL: BASIC FACTS ABOUT THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW (2013), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/general/12-57491-Guide-
to-UNCITRAL-e.pdf [https://perma.cclPFH3-FJCY] (archived Oct. 4, 2017).
80. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 25567.
81. G.A. Res. 43/165, United Nations Convention on International Bills of
Exchange and International Promissory Notes (Dec. 9, 1988).
82. UNITED NATIONS COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW, LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON
INSOLVENCY LAW: PARTS ONE AND Two (2004),
http://www.uncitral.org/pdflenglish/texts/insolven/05-80722-Ebook.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8SBQ-RK9K] (archived Sept. 21, 2017); UNITED NATIONS COMM'N ON
INT'L TRADE LAW, LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY LAW: PART THREE (2010),
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/Leg-Guide-Insol-Part3-ebook-E.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E7KX-636Z] (archived Sept. 21, 2017); UNITED NATIONS COMM'N ON
INT'L TRADE LAW, LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY LAW: PART FOUR (2013),
http://www.uncitral.org/pdflenglish/texts/insolven/Leg-Guide-Insol-Part4-ebook-E.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6TAH-5BJ4] (archived Sept. 21, 2017).
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intended to "inform and assist insolvency law reform around the
world, providing a reference tool for national authorities and
legislative bodies when preparing new laws and regulations or
reviewing the adequacy of existing laws and regulations."8 3
Interestingly, the legislative guide purports to present "different
approaches and solutions available" for balancing the interests of
debtors, creditors, other stakeholders, and the public at large, so that
each legal system would be able to "choose the one most suitable to
the local context."84
That said, UNCITRAL's work on insolvency law is definitely
concerned with cross-border effects and.the need to better coordinate
among legal systems, even if states preserve power over their
domestic law. This is particularly so with UNCITRAL's 1997 Model
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, revised in 2013 to include a "Guide
to Enactment and Interpretation."8 5 The model law refers to
situations in which the "insolvent debtor has assets in more than one
State or where some of the creditors of the debtor are not from the
State where the insolvency proceeding is taking place."8 6 While the
model law suggests that "in incorporating the text of a model law into
its system, a state may modify or leave out some of its provisions,"8 7 it
also provides that "in order to achieve a satisfactory degree of
harmonization and certainty, it is recommended that States make as
few changes as possible in incorporating the Model Law into their
legal systems." UNCITRAL thus sees the model law as a "vehicle for
the harmonization of laws."8 8
Finally, the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) also plays a
significant role in devising soft law mechanisms dealing with
property law. UNIDROIT is an intergovernmental organization set
83. UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, UNITED NATIONS
COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAw, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitrallen/uncitral-texts/
insolvency/2004Guide.html (last visited Oct. 2017) [https://perma.ce/J69J-TZ9X]
(archived Sept. 21, 2017).
84. Id.
85. United Nations Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, Model Law on Cross-Border
Insolvency with Guide to Enactment and Interpretation (2014),
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/1997-Model-Law-Insol-2013-Guide-
Enactment-e.pdf [https://perma.cc/5396-ZK43] (archived Sept. 21, 2017) [hereinafter
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency].
86. UNITED NATIONS COM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAw, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW
ON CROSs-BORDER INSOLVENCY (1997), http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/
uncitraltexts/insolvency/1997Model.html [https://perma.cc/8LQT-SHYK] (archived
Sept. 21, 2017).
87. Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, supra note 85, at 25.
88. Id. at 24.
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up in 1926 by the League of Nations and re-established in 1940 on
the basis of a multilateral agreement, the Statute of UNIDROIT. 8 9
UNIDROIT's purpose is to modernize, harmonize, and coordinate
"private and in particular commercial law as between States and
groups of States and to formulate uniform law instruments,
principles and rules to achieve those objectives."90 It drafts
conventions, model laws, principles, and legal and contractual guides.
In the context of property law, one of its prominent soft law
instruments is the 2011 UNESCO-UNIDROIT Model Legislative
Provisions on State Ownership of Undiscovered Cultural Objects.91
This model law identifies the underlying commitment of the state to
"take all necessary and appropriate measures to protect undiscovered
cultural objects and to preserve them for present and future
generations."92
Although the model law focuses on national lawmaking, the
theme of cultural objects cannot be understood outside of its cross-
border context. The model law should be seen as intertwined with a
number of international and regional conventions-dealing with
instances of the border crossing of cultural objects due to armed
conflicts, thefts, or unauthorized international sales-such as the
1995 UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Imported Cultural
Objects.93 The soft law mechanism embedded in the model law on
state ownership of undiscovered cultural objects is intended, inter
alia, to facilitate the ability of states to request restitution of cultural
objects that end up in another country. The model law is therefore
intended to put states on equal footing as both sovereigns and
property owners in remedying illegal cross-border transfers.94
B. Conflict of Laws Strategy
Moving to "hard law" strategies, this subpart focuses on
institutions that play a prominent role in bridging interjurisdictional
89. INT'L INST. FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW, STATUTE (last revised
1993), http://www.unidroit.org/english/presentation/statute.pdf [https://perma.cc/24PX-
H3WY] (archived Oct. 8, 2017).
90. Id.
91. INT'L INST. FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW, MODEL LEGISLATIVE
PROVISIONS ON STATE OWNERSHIP OF UNDISCOVERED CULTURAL OBJECTS (2011),
http://www.unidroit.org/instruments/cultural-property/model-provisions
[https://perma.cc/EJV5-NAR5] (archived Sept. 21, 2017) [hereinafter Model Legislative
Provisions].
92. Id. at Provision 1.
93. Int'l Inst. for the Unification of Private Law, Convention on Stolen or
Illegally Exported Cultural Objects (June 24, 1995),
http://www.unidroit.org/instruments/cultural-property/1995-convention
[https://perma.cc/ZS28-94QR] (archived Sept. 21, 2017).
94. Model Legislative Provisions, supra note 91.
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disparities by employing the conflict of laws strategy. Therefore, the
legal instruments produced by such institutions seek, in dealing with
cross-border property cases, to improve coordination and certainty
about the domestic judicial forum that would have jurisdiction to
decide the cross-border case, the substantive and procedural laws
that would apply to it, and the extent to which judgements would be
enforced in other jurisdictions.
At the same time, the conflict of laws strategy refrains from
establishing supranational norms regarding the substance of property
law doctrines, or from requiring states to approximate such
substantive rules. The mainstay of property law ordering is reserved
to the respective domestic institutions. This subpart exemplifies how
such institutions work to implement the conflict of laws strategy in
the contexts of (a) matrimonial property and succession, and (b)
insolvency law.
1. Treaties on Matrimonial Property, Succession
This subpart highlights two types of intergovernmental
institutions that have proven dominant in devising conflict of laws
instruments on matrimonial property and succession law.
The Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH) is
an intergovernmental organization, currently comprised of eighty-two
members,95 with other countries also becoming parties to some of its
conventions and other legal instruments.9 6 The key goal of the HCCH
is to facilitate a "progressive unification" of the rules of private
international law.9 7 The various conventions facilitated by HCCH
since its establishment in 1893 thus embrace the conflict of laws
strategy.
The thirty-eight conventions adopted to date cover a broad array
of private law, commercial law, and civil procedure issues.98 In the
context of property, one might observe the lack of conventions dealing
generally with in rem rights pertaining to land, chattels, and other
95. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Becomes the 82nd Member of the Hague
Conference, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT'L L. (Oct. 19, 2016),
https://www.hech.net/en/news-archive/details/?varevent=525 [https://perma.cclV2XJ-
P5M7] (archived Sept. 21, 2017).
96. About HCCH, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT'L L.,
https://www.hcch.net/en/about (last visited Oct. 8, 2017) [https://perma.cc/23MF-LXFG]
(archived Sept. 21, 2017).
97. Id.
98. For a full list of HCCH conventions, see HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT'L L.
CONVENTIONS, PROTOCOLS AND PRINCIPLES , https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/
conventions (last visited Oct. 8, 2017) [https://perma.cc/8GW6-6JCH] (archived Sept.
21, 2017).
2 017] 1197
VANDERBILTIOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
assets. Property law issues do receive treatment, however, in the
context of matrimonial property and succession.
The Convention of 14 March 1978 on the Law Applicable to
Matrimonial Property Regimes, which entered into force in 1992,
focuses on the applicable laws that apply to matrimonial assets.99
Under Article 3, the parties may designate, before their marriage, the
law that would apply to their assets, with special provisions
pertaining to the designation of the law for all or some of the spouses'
immovable property. Articles 6-8 detail the options available to
spouses to establish the governance of an applicable law at a later
stage. Article 4 lists the criteria based on which the applicable law
would be determined, where no agreement exists between the parties.
The chief criterion established in Article 4 provides that the
matrimonial property regime would be governed by the law of the
state in which "both spouses establish their first habitual residence
after marriage."10 0 Under any of these scenarios, and with respect to
the in rem effect of the laws that apply to the matrimonial property,
Article 9 establishes the general principle by which "the effects of the
matrimonial property regime on the legal relations between a spouse
and a third party are governed by the law applicable to the
matrimonial property regime in accordance with the Convention,"
with some exceptions to this rule detailed in Article 9.101
The Convention of 1 August 1989 on the Law Applicable to
Succession to the Estates of Deceased Persons-which is not (yet) in
force-offers rules on succession that generally validate the choice of
applicable laws made by a person in regard to her/his estate, while
establishing criteria for determining the applicable law that would
apply where no such choice was made. 102
Other HCCH conventions touch on issues that have a bearing on
property interests in similar contexts. Such is the Convention of 13
January 2000 on the International Protection of Adults, in force as of
2009, which deals, inter alia, with conflict of laws rules about the
property of adult persons who are unable, due to physical or mental
disabilities, to take care of their interests.10 3
99. HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW, CONVENTION ON THE LAW
APPLICABLE TO MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY REGIMES (Mar. 14, 1978),
https://www.hech.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=87
[https://perma.cc/SWE6-BLXN] (archived Sept. 21, 2017).
100. Id. art. 4.
101. Id. art. 9.
102. HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW, CONVENTION ON THE LAW
APPLICABLE TO THE SUCCESSION TO THE ESTATES OF DECEASED PERSONS (Aug. 1, 1989),
https://www.hech.netlen/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=62
[https://perma.c/2HAC-94MR] (archived Sept. 21, 2017).
103. HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT'L LAw, CONVENTION ON THE
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF ADULTS (Jan. 13, 2003),
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The HCCH conventions provide the most prominent
international framework for the employment of the conflict of laws
strategy in the context of property law. Given the fact that legal fields
such as marital property and succession are often embedded in
locally-determined moral, social, or religious aspects, the work of an
intergovernmental institution such as HCCH and its facilitation of a
conflict of laws strategy is no small feat. It allows for a significant
degree of certainty and predictability in identifying the national laws
that would apply to the matrimonial property or succession. This
strategy may also enable either third parties outside of the marital
household or immediate relatives to reasonably plan their actions
about such assets.
A different supranational institution that has largely embraced a
conflict of laws strategy in the case of matrimonial property and
succession is the European Union (EU). As shown throughout the
Article, the EU employs all types of strategies for globalization-or
more exactly, regionalization-with respect to property matters. This
means that alongside the embracement of the conflict of laws strategy
for matrimonial property and succession, the EU also employs the
approximation strategy and the supranationalism strategy in other
contexts of property law.
Prior to discussing the use of the conflict of laws strategy for
matrimonial property and succession, the following paragraphs
identify the EU's general structure and competences.
The EU, comprising twenty-eight member stateS104 and
featuring seven major institutions,10 5 is the most extensive
supranational framework in the world.10 6 The new Treaty on
European Union (TEU),1 07 Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU),10 8 and Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=71
[https://perma.cc/A2AJ-WF5W] (archived Sept. 21, 2017).
104. The count still includes the United Kingdom, which issued a formal notice
of withdrawal from the European Union on March 29, 2017, following the results of the
June 23, 2016 referendum in favor of leaving the EU. Brexit: The UK's letter triggering
Article 50, BBC (Mar. 29, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-39431070
[https://perma.ce/6N56-S44S] (archived Oct. 8, 2017).
105. The seven main EU institutions are the European Parliament, European
Council, Council of the European Union, European Commission, Court of Justice of the
EU, European Central Bank, and European Court of Auditors. European institutions,
EUR-LEX, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossaryleu-institutions.html (last visited
Oct. 8, 2017) [https://perma.cc/8NU6-WEQQ] (archived Sept. 21, 2017).
106. For a study of these post-Lisbon institutions, see Laurent Pech, The
Institutional Development of the EU Post-Lisbon: A Case of Plus Qa Change?, in THE
EUROPEAN UNION AFTER THE TREATY OF LISBON 7, 22-32 (D. Ashiagbor et al. eds.,
2012).
107. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Dec. 13, 2007,
2012 O.J. (C 326) 13.
108. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, Dec. 13, 2007, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47.
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European Union (EU Charter)10 9 cover more thematic ground than
ever before. At the same time, the EU still falls short of being a full-
fledged federal entity.110
Article 2 of the TFEU identifies three distinct categories of EU
competence: exclusive, supporting, and shared.1 1  Exclusive
competence entrusts legislative powers only to the EU, unless
members are empowered to act by the EU or work to implement the
acts of the Union. The scope of exclusive competence is defined in
Article 3(1) of the TFEU, which refers to customs union, competition
rules, Euro monetary policy, marine conservation, common
commercial policy, and some aspects of external relations addressed
in Article 3(2).112
Supporting competence enables the EU to support, coordinate,
and supplement the actions of Member States without superseding
their actions in these areas. This competence applies to matters such
as protection of human health, industry, culture, tourism, and
education.11 3
The most intricate type of competence, which is also understood
to serve as a residual category, is that of a shared competence. Article
2(2) of the TFEU provides that member states "shall exercise their
competence to the extent that the [EU] has not exercised its
competence" or "has decided to cease exercising its competence."114
The principal (though unclosed) list of areas of shared competences in
Article 4(2) of the TFEU includes eleven items, the most notable of
which for the property context is the "internal market."1 15 The
concept of the internal market, which has been a mainstay of the
European economic community from the EU's inception and which
still serves as its major pillar, is articulated in Article 26(2) of the
TFEU: "[t]he internal market shall comprise an area without internal
frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and
capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty."
116
109. Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 12, 2007,
2012 O.J. (C 326) 391.
110. Thus, the EU has some state-like features, such as an autonomous legal
order; rules addressed directly to member states; power to legislate; a system of
democratic governance; judicial controls; and economic and monetary union. But it also
has some significant non-state features, such as reservation of core elements of
national sovereignty in matters such as security and defense or taxation; and the lack
of concepts such as territory and population. See ALLAN ROSAS & LORNA ARMATI, EU
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 15-19 (2d ed. 2012).
11. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, supra note 108, art. 2.
112. Id. art. 3.
113. Id. art. 6.
114. Id. art. 2(2).
115. Id. art. 4(2).
116. Id. art. 26(2).
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It is in the context of the EU's shared competence to promote the
"internal market" that one should consider the use of the conflict of
laws strategy for matrimonial property and succession.
To start with, Regulation No. 650/2012 on jurisdiction, applicable
law, and enforcement of decisions in matters of succession is intended
to ensure that a "given succession is treated coherently, by one single
court applying one single law."117 At the same time, it "in no way
alters the substantive national rules on succession."18 The EU
Regulation on succession therefore clearly embraces the conflict of
laws strategy.
The Succession Regulation generally establishes the deceased's
habitual residence at the time of death as the basis for both national
jurisdiction and the law that applies to the succession as a whole.1 19
While allowing for some flexibility regarding both jurisdiction and
applicable law, especially when a person chooses to apply the law of
his or her nationality to the succession-if different from the place of
habitual residence-the Regulation principally promotes the concept
of the unity of the succession.120 This has obvious implications for the
ranking of cross-border property interests. The entire pool of assets
included in the estate is to be governed by a single law. This means
that the recognition and prioritization of property interests in regard
to assets, including those located outside of the respective territory,
are subjected to the unity principle.
In those cases in which there is a divergence between the
jurisdiction and applicable law, and the two legal systems differ on
the recognition of a certain type of an in rem right, Article 31 of the
Regulation provides that:
Where a person invokes a right in rem to which he is entitled under the law
applicable to the succession and the law of the Member State in which the right
is invoked does not know the right in rem in question, that right shall, if
necessary and to the extent possible, be adapted to the closest equivalent right
in rem under the law of that State .... 121
In addition to the abovementioned rules on conflict of laws, the
Regulation also establishes a European Certificate of Succession,
which is issued by the authorized national court and is recognized in
117. See Regulation 650/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council,
July 4, 2012, 2012 O.J. (L 201) 107.
118. Succession and wills, EUROPEAN COMM'N,
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/family-matters/successions/indexen.htm (last visited
Oct. 8, 2017) [https://perma.cc/FRY4-JH9H] (archived Sept. 21, 2017).
119. Regulation 650/2012, supra note 117, art 2.
120. Jan von Hein, Conflicts between International Property, Family and
Succession Law - Interfaces and Regulatory Techniques (2016) (working paper) (on file
with author).
121. Regulation 650/2012, supra note 117, art. 31.
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all EU countries without any special procedure.122 This mechanism
allows for an effective enforcement of this type of a conflict of laws
strategy.
In June 2016, the EU adopted regulations for implementing
"enhanced cooperation" in the area of jurisdiction, applicable law, and
enforcement of decisions in property matters concerning both married
couples (Council Regulation (EU) 2016/1103)123 and registered
partners (Council Regulation (EU) 2016/1104).124 Agreed to by
eighteen EU member states, this "enhanced cooperation"s2 5 follows a
conflict of laws strategy in property matters upon the dissolution of
spousal relations with a cross-border dimension. In so doing, the
"enhanced cooperation" seeks to increase certainty about rules on
jurisdiction, applicable law, and enforcement in an area of law
otherwise marked by considerable substantive differences among
various states. In particular, it seeks to "end parallel proceedings-
costing around C1.1bn annually-in various member states whose
courts have to settle such property disputes."126
2. Treaties on Insolvency
The EU is also employing the conflict of laws strategy in another
prominent field that has a major bearing on property interests:
insolvency law. The essence of an insolvency proceeding, and
bankruptcy in particular, can be essentially conceptualized as a
property law setting: the bankruptcy court must rank competing
122. Id. arts. 62-73; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1329/2014
of 9 December 2014 establishing the forms referred to in Regulation (EU) No 650/2012
of the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction, applicable law,
recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement of authentic
instruments in matters of succession and on the creation of a European Certificate of
Succession, 2014 O.J. (L 359) 30.
123. Council Regulation (EU) 2016/1103 of June 24 2016 implementing
enhanced cooperation in the area of jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and
enforcement of decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes, 2016 O.J. (L 183)
1.
1 124. Council Regulation (EU) 2016/1104 of June 24 2016 implementing
enhanced cooperation in the area of jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and
enforcement of decisions in matters of the property consequences of registered
partnerships, 2016 O.J. (L 183) 30.
125. Under Article 31 of TFEU, enhanced cooperation allows a group of at least
nine Member States to implement measures if all 28 Member States fail to reach an
agreement. Other EU countries keep the right to join the enhanced cooperation
framework at a later time. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union, supra note 108, art. 31.
126. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT PRESS RELEASE, INTERNATIONAL DIVORCES: NEW
RULES ON WHOSE COURTS SETTLE PROPERTY DISPUTES (JUNE 23, 2016),
http://www.europarl.europa.edulnews/en/news-room/201606221PR33203/international-
divorce-new-rules-on-whose-courts-settle-property-disputes [https://perma.cc/QQ8Q-
P3VE] (archived SEPT. 21, 2017).
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property interests in deciding how and to whom to allocate priority
over a limited pool of assets.12 7 With the ever-growing increase in the
number of insolvency proceedings that have a significant cross-border
dimension, in the sense that a certain person or corporation has
creditors and/or assets in many jurisdictions, the EU has engaged in
legislation aimed at providing rules on jurisdiction, applicable law,
and enforcement.
Thus, according to Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000,128
which was recast in 2015 in Regulation (EU) 2015/848,129 the debtor's
''centre of main interests" is identified as the basis for establishing
the territory whose national courts are authorized to open insolvency
proceedings.1 0
The law of the member state in whose jurisdiction the insolvency
proceedings are opened is generally the applicable law that governs
the proceedings.'3 1 At the same time, according to Article 8, which
deals with third parties' rights in rem: "[t]he opening of insolvency
proceedings shall not affect the rights in rem of creditors or third
parties in respect of tangible or intangible, moveable or immoveable
assets . . . belonging to the debtor which are situated within the
territory of another member state at the time of the opening of
proceedings."l32 Article 8 thus seeks to balance the role for a unified
settlement of insolvency proceedings with the need to respect and
validate in rem rights in favor of third parties where certain assets
are located.
The essentiality of providing an effective solution for insolvency
proceedings with a cross-border element has led to efforts for a
similar conflict of laws strategy on a broader scale. As Part IV.A.2
showed, UNCITRAL has been promoting soft law mechanisms,
comprising a legislative guide on insolvency law and a model law on
cross-border insolvency. At the same time, UNCITRAL is currently
considering the possibility of developing a binding international
convention on selected aspects of international bankruptcy law.' 3 3
This shift seems essential especially because, as of the beginning of
2017, only forty states had adopted some version of the model law on
127. Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy as Property Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 206-220 (K. Ayotte & H.E. Smith eds., 2011).
128. Council Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency
proceedings, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 5.
129. Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and the Council of
20 May 2015 on insolvency proceedings, 2015 O.J. (L 141) 19.
130. Id. art. 3.
131. Id. art. 7(1).
132. Id.
133. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, Annotated Provisional Agenda for the Fiftieth
Session of Working Group V (Insolvency Law), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.141 (Sept.
26, 2016).
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cross-border insolvency. It may be the case that UNCITRAL's soft law
mechanisms have reached their limits of effectiveness, so that a
binding convention would now be required.134 The current agenda,
though still in early consideration, seems to focus on a conflict of laws
strategy, establishing rules on jurisdiction, law, and enforcement of
cross-border bankruptcy proceedings.
C. Approximation Strategy
This subpart examines how cross-border institutions implement
the approximation strategy, by which binding supranational
instruments such as conventions require states to approximate their
substantive and procedural norms on a certain theme. Some of the
institutions featured below were presented in the contexts of soft law
mechanisms and the conflict of laws strategy. The discussion will
start, however, with introducing the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and its role in the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement.
1. Intellectual Property Conventions
The WTO, established in 1995, is the successor of the 1948
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as the chief
international institution for trade issues. Designed to streamline
cross-border trade, the WTO serves as a negotiation forum for
resolving trade problems, and specifically for crafting binding
international instruments.135
The WTO Agreement is actually made up of about sixty
agreements, falling into six main parts: (1) umbrella agreement that
sets up, inter alia, the WTO organization and its different organs;
(2)-(4) three agreements, each covering one key area of trade
addressed by the WTO: goods, services, and intellectual property; (5)
dispute settlements; and (6) reviews of governments' trade policies.13 6
Prior to introducing the TRIPS Agreement and its use of the,
approximation strategy in the context of intellectual property, one
should take note of a significant institutional feature of the WTO: its
binding dispute settlement mechanism. In many ways, it is the
134. Bob Vessels, Towards a Worldwide International Insolvency Convention?,
UNIVERSITEIT LEIDEN: LEIDEN L. BLOG (May 24, 2016),
http://leidenlawblog.nl/articles/towards-a-worldwide-international-insolvency-
convention [https://perma.cc/9B9A-S88C] (archived Sept. 21, 2017).
135. Who we are, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatise/whowearee.htm (last visited Oct. 8,
2017) [https://perma.cc/H9UG-DRET] (archived Sept. 21, 2017).
136. JOOST H.B. PAUWELYN, ANDREW T. GUZMAN & JENNIFER A. HILLMAN,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 100 (3d ed. 2016).
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existence of this institutional feature that enables the WTO to
promote and enforce an approximation strategy in the context of
intellectual property.
The WTO's dispute settlement mechanism is administered by its
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which is part of the WTO's General
Council, so that all WTO members are members of and may
participate in the DSB.137 The DSB sets up panels to adjudicate
specific disputes among states. The panel's final report is referred to
the DSB for formal adoption, which takes place within sixty days
unless there is a consensus among member states not to adopt it or
an appeal has been filed to the WTO Appellate Body. 138
This institutional structure has a direct bearing on property.
This is so because the TRIPS Agreement1 3 9 was tied to the WTO from
its inception as part of a package,. and accordingly, the DSB has
jurisdiction to adjudicate conflicts between states in matters of
intellectual property under TRIPS.140 This mechanism enables a
state to initiate proceedings against another state for taking
measures that do not comply with the respondent state's
commitments under TRIPS. In contrast, disputes between private
parties about an alleged infringement of a certain intellectual
property right, whether such a case involves a cross-border dimension
or not, are left to the authorized domestic courts.
The TRIPS Agreement advances the approximation strategy for
intellectual property rights-which include patents, copyrights,
trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs, and layout
designs of integrated circuits-in a number of ways.141
First, it sets out minimum substantive standards of protection to
be provided by each national system of the signatory states. Beyond
reiterating the minimum standards set out in the Paris Convention
on Patents and Trademarks14 2 and the Berne Convention on
Copyrights,143 the TRIPS Agreement goes on to establish additional
minimum standards for the different rights.144
137. Id. at 128-31.
138. Id. at 135. The negative consensus rule is a fundamental change from the
previous dispute settlement system under GATT, where a positive consensus was
required to adopt a final report, thus permitting a dissatisfied losing party to block any
action on the report. Id.
139. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197.
140. PAUWELYN ET AL., supra note 136 at 708-19.
141. Id.
142. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1888,
828 U.N.T.S. 305.
143. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept.
9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221.
144. PAUWELYN ET AL., supra note 136, at 708.
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Second, TRIPS requires national legal systems to strengthen
their enforcement mechanisms, prescribing both civil and criminal
procedures.145 This facet of the approximation strategy thus
underscores the institutional role that national bodies must play in
ensuring that the cross-border substantive commitments undertaken
by signatory states are credible and effective.
Third, TRIPS seeks to ensure the international enforcement of
intellectual property rights by subjecting the Agreement to the WTO's
binding dispute settlement mechanism, operating through the DSB
and backed up by the possibility of trade sanctions in the case of
systematic noncompliance.146 This aspect of TRIPS therefore relies on
the general institutional mechanisms that proved essential in making
the WTO work.147 For the approximation strategy to be effectively
applied, cross-border and domestic institutions must be mutually
reinforcing in meeting the minimum standards set up by TRIPS. This
institutional dimension is also what sets TRIPS apart from the
earlier generations of intellectual property conventions, which were
lacking in domestic and international enforcement.14 8 Thus, under
Article 33 of the Berne Convention on Copyrights, the settlement of
interstate disputes should have been resolved by the International
Court of Justice (ICJ), but this provision was subject to state
reservations and has never effectively resulted in even a single ICJ
dispute settlement process over copyrights.14 9
2. Cultural Property
UNIDROIT, the international organization whose work in
promoting soft law mechanisms was depicted in Part IV.A.2, has also
facilitated several binding international instruments. One such
example, employing an approximation strategy, is the 1995
UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural
Objects.'50 The Convention, aimed at aiding the "fight against illicit
trade in cultural objects," does so by "establishing common, minimal
legal rules for the restitution and return of cultural objects between
Contracting States."15
The Convention's use of the approximation strategy in regard to
national legal systems concerns two different types of scenarios: (1)
the stealing of cultural objects, whether such an act remains within
145. Id. at 709.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 708.
149. Jane C. Ginsburg, International Copyright: From a 'Bundle' of National
Copyright Laws to a Supranational Code?, 47 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S. 265, 278 (2000).
150. Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, supra note 93.
151. Id. para. 4.
[VOL 50:117312o6
GLOBALIZING PROPERTY LAW:AN INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
the territory of a certain state or whether it involves the crossing of
national borders; and (2) the unlawful removal of cultural objects
from their state of origin and their transfer to another contracting
state.15 2 The Convention sets substantial standards for claims of
restitution and the right of the possessor, under certain
circumstances, to compensation upon such restitution. It gives
additional instructions to national courts on how to balance the
interests of the different parties-concerning both disputes between
private parties and those between a possessor and a foreign
government-in the case of an unauthorized transfer of a cultural
object across national borders.1 53
The Convention provides that "[n]othing in this Convention shall
prevent a Contracting State from applying any rules more favourable
to the restitution or the return of stolen or illegally exported cultural
objects than provided for by this Convention."154 It therefore could be
seen as setting minimum standards for the protection of cultural
objects, somewhat similar to the TRIPS Agreement discussed in Part
IV.C.1. Moreover, the fact that the Convention relies on national
courts for the enforcement of its substantive and procedural
provisions, rather than establishing a supranational tribunal for
adjudication of disputes over cross-border transfers of cultural
objects, further shows how the UNIDROIT Convention generally opts
for an approximation strategy.
D. Supranationalism Strategy
This subpart highlights the institutional aspects of the
supranationalism strategy, which entrusts supranational institutions
with binding lawmaking and enforcement powers. The resulting
supranational norms enjoy some type of a superior legal status over
national norms in case of conflict, even if the application of such
norms may be tempered or limited by adopting certain principles that
defer to domestic rules in some cases. As demonstrated below, the
supranationalism strategy for property law relies on the existence of
binding and effective supranational institutions-be they legislative,
administrative, or adjudicative. This state of affairs demonstrates
that as we move up the ladder of the strategies for globalization from
the more constrained ones of "soft law" mechanisms or the conflict of
laws strategy, to the midlevel approximation strategy, and up to the
most ambitious supranationalism strategy, there is greater need for
152. SJEF VAN ERP & BRAM AKKERMANS, CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT ON
PROPERTY LAW 1121-22 (2012).
153. Id.
154. Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, supra note 93.
2017] 1207
VANDERBILT]OURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
effective supranational institutions that may preempt national laws
in appropriate cases.
1. EU - Negative/Positive Harmonization
As Part IV.B.1 has shown, the European Union is the most
comprehensive international organization in the world, and its
different institutions carry out legislative, administrative, and
adjudicative roles based on the division of competences between the
European Union and the member states. In some cases, such as in
matrimonial property and succession, the European Union settles for
a conflict of laws strategy, which leaves to the states the power to
legislate substantive legal norms. In other cases, the European Union
may opt for a more ambitious strategy, such as the supranationalism
one. In such instances, EU institutions seek to create EU law that
could supersede conflicting national norms.
The move toward supranational norms in the European Union is
depicted as comprising "negative" and "positive" components.155 The
negative feature relates mostly to the protection of substantive
principles set forth in EU treaties, such as those relating to the
freedom.of. movement of capital, goods, services, and persons within
the internal market, enshrined in Article 26 of the TFEU.
. To enforce the "negative" component, the Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU) is entrusted with ensuring that member
states and EU institutions abide by EU law, and that it would be
interpreted the same way in every state,156 while granting states
some leeway through principles such as proportionality.157
Another major setting of "negative" harmonization through
treaty law, enforced by the CJEU, concerns the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which went into force in
2009.158 The right to property is explicitly articulated in Article 17 of
the Charter.5 9 The CJEU is thus tasked both with ensuring that
state law does not violate the right to property in the Charter, and
155. VAN ERP & AKKERMANS, supra note 152, at 1024-25.
156. Court of Justice of the European Union, EUROPEAN UNION,
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/institutions-bodies/court-justice-en (last
visited Oct. 8, 2017) [https://perma.cc/3S5T-74VL] (archived Sept. 21, 2017).
157. Takis Tridimas, Competence after Lisbon: The Elusive Search for Bright
Lines, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AFTER THE TREATY OF LISBON 47, 49-55 (D. Ashiagbor
et al. eds., 2012).
158. 2012 O.J. (C 326) 393.
159. Article 17 states as follows: "1. Everyone has the right to own, use, dispose
of and bequeath his or her lawfully acquired possessions. No one may be deprived of his
or her possessions, except in the public interest and in the cases and under the
conditions provided for by law, subject to fair compensation being paid in good time for
their loss. The use of property may be regulated by law in so far as is necessary for the
general interest. 2. Intellectual property shall be protected." 2012 O.J. (C 326) 399.
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that other EU law-regulations, directives, etc.-does not contradict
this and other rights.160
Alongside the "negative" component, legislative EU institutions
also engage in "positive harmonization," i.e., promulgating
regulations, directives, and other legislative acts that seek to equate
or otherwise harmonize private law doctrines, including in matters of
property law.
The competence of EU institutions to do so is a highly
complicated matter. This is particularly so with respect to Article 114
of the TFEU, which reads, inter alia, that EU institutions shall
"adopt the measures for the approximation of the provisions laid
down by law, regulation or administrative action in member states
which have as their object the establishment and functioning of the
internal market."16 1 While this provision could have been interpreted
as an open-ended mandate for EU institutions to engage in
supranational norm-making, the CJEU has held in Germany v.
Parliament and Council (the Tobacco Advertising case)162 that the EU
legislature does not have a "general power to regulate the internal
market" and that a "mere finding of disparities between national
rules and of the abstract risk of obstacles to the exercise of
fundamental freedoms or of distortions of competition" forms an
insufficient basis to establish EU competence to act.163 However, later
ECJ cases seem to have opted for a less stringent approach,164
approving in one case the use of "minimum harmonization" contract
legislation adopted under the former version of Article 114 of the
TFEU.16 5 In the context of property, one could mention the 1993
directive on cultural property,166 a 2011 directive on late payments
160. For example, in its 2013 Trabelsi decision, the CJEU invalidated the
Council of the EU's decision to freeze the assets of one of the petitioners, finding it
violative of the petitioner's right to property. Holding that a limitation on the exercise
of the right of property must (1) "have a legal basis," (2) "refer to an objective of public
interest, recognized as such by the EU," and (3) "not be excessive"-meaning that it
"must be necessary and proportional to the aim sought" without impairing the
"essential content" of the right-the CJEU held that the Council failed to meet this test
in the specific circumstances. Case T-187/11, Trabelsi v. Council, ¶¶ 74-117 (May 28,
2013), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsfdocid=137742&doclang=EN
[https://perma.cc/79GF-HL3J] (archived Oct. 8, 2017).
161. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, supra note 108, art. 114(1). t
162. Case C-376/98, Germany v. Parliament and Council, 2000 E.C.R. 1-8419.
163. Id. ¶T 83-84.
164. Lucinda Miller, European Contract Law after Lisbon, in THE EUROPEAN
UNION AFTER THE TREATY OF LISBON 247-49 (D. Ashiagbor et al. eds., 2012).
165. Case C-205/07, Lodewijk Gysbrechts and Santurel Inter BVBA, 2008
E.C.R. 1-9947.
166. Directive 93/7/EEC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15
March 1993 on the Return of Cultural Objects Unlawfully Removed from the Territory
of a Member State, 1993 O.J. (L 74) 74.
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addressing the issue of retention of title,167 and the regulation on
insolvency proceedings.168 More ambitious efforts, such as designing
an EU-level single system of security rights through a European
Security Right in movables,169 or a Eurohypothec for real estate,170
have so far not come to fruition. The most significant achievement so
far in the context of EU "positive harmonization" on property law-
the EU Patent Package-will be discussed in Part IV.D.6.
2. European Convention on Human Rights
The evolution of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms1 7' and the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) is often depicted as one of the most
incredible phenomena in the history 'of international law.172 The
European Convention, signed by forty-seven member states of the
Council of Europe,17 3 establishes the right to property in Article 1 of
the First Protocol.174 As the following paragraphs show, the
increasing role of the ECHR in interpreting the scope of the right to
property, by applying substantive principles such as "fair balance"
and "proportionality," has resulted in a thick body of case law that
employs a substantial supranationalism strategy in property law
across Europe.
The property jurisprudence of ECHR had initially opted for a
relatively narrow review of the deprivation or regulation of property,
focusing on lawfulness or a "quality of law" principle, under which
167. Directive 2011/7 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16
February 2011 on Combating Late Payments in Commercial Transactions, 2011 O.J. (L
48) 1.
168. Commission Regulation 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 20 May 2015 on Insolvency Proceedings, 2015 O.J. (L 141) 19.
169. EVA M. KIENINGER, SECURITY RIGHTS IN MOVABLE PROPERTY IN EUROPEAN
PRIVATE LAW 6 (2009).
170. Otmar St6cker, The Eurohypothec, in THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN
PROPERTY LAW 65 (Sjef van Erp et al. eds., 2012).
171. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter CPHRFF].
172. Michael O'Boyle, On Reforming the Operation of the European Court of
Human Rights, 1 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 1 (2008).
173. For a list of members of the Council of Europe see 47 Member States,
COUNCIL OF EUR., http://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/47-members-states (last visited Oct.
8, 2017) [http://perma.cc/B7BS-KAT2] (archived Sept. 21, 2017).
174. The first paragraph reads: "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions
except in the public interest and subject to .the conditions provided for by law and by
the general principles of international law." The second paragraph states: "The
preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to
enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance
with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or
penalties." CPHRFF, supra note 171, art. 1.
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states had only to demonstrate that they complied with the formal
requirements of their legal system and that such rules were
sufficiently accessible, precise, and foreseeable. This early approach
has thus served as a procedural check, focusing on formalities and
due process, rather than on constructing a set of supranational
substantive concepts.175 This approach changed in the 1982 Sporrung
and Lonnroth v. Sweden1 76 and 1986 James v. United Kingdom1 77
cases. In these cases, the ECHR developed self-standing criteria of
"fair balance" and "proportionality" for reviewing domestic legislation
or regulation.7 8 These supranational criteria now cover the entire
array of rights in the European Convention.'79
Therefore, while leaving states with a "margin of appreciation"
in defining both the public purpose and the means required to achieve
it,180 the ECHR's review of state legislation, administrative actions,
and state court decisions has in many cases resulted in the ECHR
overturning or otherwise preempting national property law. Property
issues are featured prominently in the ECHR's docket. Between 1959
and 2015, 12.2 percent of all cases in which the ECHR found a
violation of the Convention dealt with the right to property.'18 This
means that during that period, the ECHR found a violation of the
right to property in about three thousand cases, leading in many
cases to invalidation of the state action that resulted in an
infringement.
It should be noted, however, that there is a difference between
the scope of the margin of appreciation granted in cases said to
implicate the "deprivation" of property under the first paragraph of
Article 1 of the First Protocol and in those dealing with regulation
that works to "control the use of property" under Article 1's second
paragraph.182 The first type of case is usually subject to a higher level
of scrutiny and stricter application of supranational standards, such
as fair balance and proportionality.183 On the other hand, when
evaluating a regulation that controls the use of property without
175. Tom Allen, Compensation for Property under the European Convention on
Human Rights, 28 MICH. J. INT'L L. 287, 292-93 (2007).
176. Sporrung v. Sweden, 52 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1982).
177. James v. United Kingdom, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. 123 (1986).
178. Id. para. 50.
179. ED BATES, THE EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS: FROM ITS INCEPTION TO THE CREATION OF A PERMANENT COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 5-8 (2010).
180. Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the
Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR 1-4 (2002).
181. EUR. CT. OF Hum. RTS., OVERVIEW 1959-2015 (2016),
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Overview_19592015_ENG.pdf
[http://perma.cc/GC9A-W82A] (archived Sept. 21, 2017).
182. See CPHRFF, supra note 171.
183. Arai-Takahashi, supra note 180, at 149-50.
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expropriating it de facto or de jure, the ECHR has granted states a
particularly wide margin of appreciation to design an underlying
policy, choose the means to achieve the public goal, and evaluate the
effects such means have on property.184
With this differentiation in mind, the jurisprudence of the ECHR
currently serves as probably the most extensive judicial application of
the supranationalism strategy in property. This is made possible first
and foremost by the institutional power granted to the ECHR and its
expansive right of standing.185 The ECHR serves, therefore, as a clear
example of how a supranationalism strategy in property law hinges to
a large extent on effective supranational institutions.
3. American Convention on Human Rights
The American continent is home to a regional supranational
ordering that has a bearing on property law, although the scope and
authority of the Organization of American States (OAS) and its
various institutions, presented below, is significantly narrower than
the European context.
The OAS, established in 1948 and currently comprised of all of
the continent's thirty-five states, has adopted a series of instruments,
including ones intended for the protection of human rights.186 The
key binding instrument adopted by OAS is the American Convention
on Human Rights, which was signed in 1969 and went into force in
1978.187 So far, twenty-five OAS Member States have ratified the
Convention.'8 8 Interestingly, the United States and Canada have not
done so.'8 9
The two key OAS institutions operating under the American
Convention are the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
tasked with, among other things, submitting petitions for alleged
184. AGOSI v. United Kingdom, 108 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 52 (1986)
("[T]he State enjoys a wide margin of appreciation with regard both to choosing the
means of enforcement and to ascertaining whether the consequences of enforcement
are justified in the general interest for the purpose of achieving the object of the law in
question.").
185. BATES, supra note 179, at 319-49.
186. INTER-AMERICAN COMM'N ON HUm. RTS., INTRODUCTION,
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/basicdocuments.asp (last visited Oct. 8, 2017)
[http://perma.cc/3539-KTP5] (archived Sept. 21, 2017).
187. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights,
Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143 [hereinafter ACHR].
188. For a list of the signatories and the current status of ratifications, see
Multinational Treaties, American Convention on Human Rights, ORG. OF AM. STATES,
http://www.oas.org/dil/treatiesB-
32 American ConventiononHumanRights-sign.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2017)
[http://perma.cclR9ER-AMTB] (archived Sept. 21, 2017).
189. Id.
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violations of human rights,190 and the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, authorized to apply and interpret the American
Convention following such petitions.1 91 The work of these institutions
plays a significant role in the ability of the American Convention to
allow for some kind of a supranationalism strategy in human rights,
including under Article 21, which articulates the right to property.1 92
The most prominent cases handed down by the Court, according to
Article 21, have dealt with indigenous tribes' rights to land. 193
4. Bilateral Investment Treaties
International investment treaties, prominently taking the form
of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), are a burgeoning
phenomenon. As of 2016, BITs numbered about 2,950 worldwide,
following a dramatic rise in the early 1990s, with about 350 other
190. What is IACHR?, INTER-AMERICAN COMM'N ON HUM. RTS.,
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/what.asp (last visited Oct. 8, 2017)
[http://perma.ccNGV8-DCTC] (archived Sept. 21, 2017).
191. INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/corte/estatuto.cfm?lang-en (last visited Oct. 8, 2017)
[http://perma.cc/W72Q-TAFZ] (archived Sept. 21, 2017).
192. Article 21 reads: "1. Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his
property. The law may subordinate such use and enjoyment to the interest of society. 2.
No one shall be deprived of his property except upon payment of just compensation, for
reasons of public utility or social interest, and in the cases and according to the forms
established by law. 3. Usury and any other form of exploitation of man by man shall be
prohibited by law." ACHR, supra note 187.
193. See, e.g., Sawhoyamaxa v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146 (2006). The Sawhoyamaxa tribe argued
that the government of Paraguay had failed to complete its own initiative to recover
part of the ancestral lands of the tribe of over 14,000 hectares in the Chaco region of
Paraguay, even though Paraguayan law recognizes the right of indigenous peoples to
preserve their way of life in their habitat and to protect the claimed lands. The
government contended that, although it was committed to solving the matter, the lands
in question had been formally purchased by a German citizen, who uses the land for
beef production. Consequently, the executive branch's efforts to expropriate the land
had been met with staunch resistance by the legislature in view of the provisions of the
1993 BIT between Germany and Paraguay. In March 2006, ruling in favor of the tribe,
the Inter-American Court reasoned that the enforcement of bilateral investment
treaties may not allow a state to infringe its obligations under the American
Convention. As for the problem of conflicting rights in the land, the Court reasoned
that although it is 'not a domestic judicial authority with jurisdiction to decide disputes
among private parties,' it is nevertheless competent to 'analyze whether the State
ensured the human rights of the members of the Sawhoyamaxa Community.' According
to the Court, the government's recognition of the tribe's rights to traditional lands
remains 'meaningless in practice if the lands have not been physically . . . surrendered
because the adequate domestic measures necessary to secure effective use and
enjoyment of said right . . . are lacking.' The court ordered the State to adopt measures
to return the land to the Sawhoyamaxa Community. Id. paras. 136-43. For further
elaboration, see Amnon Lehavi, The Global Law of the Land, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 425,
452-55 (2010).
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treaties-such as those dealing with free trade-including special
provisions about protection of investments.9 4 BITs tie together not
only developed-developing country dyads, but also developed country
dyads and developing country dyads. Just about every country is
party to at least one such treaty.95 As the following paragraphs
show, BITs prove to be a significant force in the implementation of a
supranationalism strategy (albeit in the form of bilateral treaties),
due to the focus of the term "investment" on property rights and the
institutional role of independent arbitration tribunals.
To put things in historical context, the first BIT is commonly
traced to the agreement signed in 1959 between Germany and
Pakistan in the aftermath of the end of colonialism and the decline of
customary international law norms on the protection of foreign
investments.196
During the 1950s, a number of newly independent countries
embarked on a series of massive expropriations of properties and
enterprises controlled by foreign investors from Western economies.
Nationalizations and expropriations have been a recurring theme in
international investment, reaching another peak during the 1970s,
and never truly disappearing.'9 7
Despite the slow start, the number of BITs grew from a handful
to a few dozen each year following a series of key events-notably, the
debt crisis of developing countries in the 1980s and the collapse of the
Soviet bloc-and in response to the advancement of a neoliberal
policy by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The
current scope of BITs extends, however, well beyond the paradigm of
a developed, capital-exporting country conditioning the flow of
investments into a capital-dependent developing country on signing a
BIT. Capital is currently flowing also from "South" to "North" through
sovereign wealth funds, government subsidiaries, and private
corporations based in China, Russia, the Persian Gulf, and
elsewhere.'98
From a legal and institutional perspective, BITs typically
implement three related measures: (1) a commitment by host
194. UNITED NATIONS CONF. ON TRADE AND DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT
- INVESTOR NATIONALITY: POLIcY CHALLENGES 101-02 (2016),
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir20l6_en.pdfhttp://unctad.org/en/Publicatio
nsLibrary/wir2016_en.pdf, [http://perma.cc/3SYL-NMZC] (archived Sept. 21, 2017).
195. For a list of International Investment Treaties, see International
Investment Agreements Navigator, INV. POL'Y HUB,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA (last visited Oct. 8, 2017)
[http://perma.cc/F65M-AA6D] (archived Sept. 21, 2017).
196. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment
Agreements, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L. & POL'Y 157, 169 (2005).
197. Amnon Lehavi & Amir N. Licht, BITs and Pieces of Property, 36 YALE J.
INT'L. L. 115, 120 (2011).
198. WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT, supra note 194, at 3-12.
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countries to a certain set of substantive standards of treatment for
foreign investment; (2) a direct right of action for investors against
host countries for an alleged breach of these commitments; and (3) a
resolution of disputes by international arbitration, most often by the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID),
which is affiliated with the World Bank.9 9 The substantive
commitments that states undertake in BITs typically include the
duties of national treatment, most-favored-nation treatment, fair and
equitable treatment, and guarantees of compensation with respect to
expropriation (direct or indirect). The term "investment" is typically
defined as comprising a list of rights in various assets, with
immovable property featured regularly in such lists, and the types of
property rights covered in BITs, including not only ownership but
also leases, mortgages, liens, pledges, etc.20 0
Consequently, BIT jurisprudence has gradually shifted toward a
"property discourse," focusing on investors' property rights as the
object of legal protection, and balancing these rights against states'
legislative and regulatory powers, while also borrowing from the
property jurisprudence of the European Convention, the US
Constitution, and other legal instruments.2 0
Recent years have also seen dramatic growth in the number of
arbitration cases. By the end of 2015, the total number of known
treaty-based cases stood at 696, with a record of seventy new disputes
filed during 2015. So far, 107 countries have been sued at least once
for an alleged breach of a BIT. 202 Moreover, the success rate of
investors in such arbitrations has been significant. Out of all the
decisions made on the merits of the case up until the end of 2015, a
majority of the cases-60 percent-have been decided in favor of the
investor.2 03 This means that the interpretation of BITs and the
consequent protection of "investments" go well beyond the application
of host governments' laws, and thus implement a supranationalism
strategy.
199. INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT FOR INVESTMENT DISPUTES,
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2017) [https://perma.cc/2KQD-T5DG
(archived Oct. 8, 2017).
200. International Investment Agreements Navigator, supra note 195.
201. Lehavi & Licht, supra note 197, at 128-32.
202. UNITED NATIONS CONF. ON TRADE AND DEV., INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT: REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENT IN 2015, at 2 (2016),
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.orgUpload/ISDS%2OIssues%20Note%202016.pdfhtt
p://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.orgUpload/ISDS%2OIssues%2Note%202016.pdf
[http://perma.cc/9E3A-6LZ8] (archived Sept. 21, 2017).
203. Id. at 7.
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5. European Unified Patent
The EU is currently in the process of introducing a unitary
patent package, which will include an EU-wide registry for patents
and a Unified Patent Court.204 The patent package will introduce a
significant supranationalism strategy for this type of intellectual
property, going well beyond the current approximation strategy
embedded in TRIPS. This scheme serves as yet another vivid example
of the centrality of authorized institutions-here, the current
institutions of the EU and the new court-for the supranationalism
strategy.
The unitary patent is the first piece of the EU patent package.2 05
It is based on two EU regulations that went into force in 2013.
Regulation (EU) No. 1257/2012 on "implementing enhanced
cooperation in the creation of unitary patent protection"206 lays the
foundations for a unitary patent, which would be granted by the
European Patent Office,2 07 and to which a unitary effect for the
territories of the twenty-six participating states (all EU countries
except for Spain and Croatia) would be given after its
grant.20 8 Council Regulation (EU) No. 1260/2016 on "applicable
translation arrangements" 209 sets out the translation arrangement
required for such unitary protection across the twenty-six
participating states.
Both regulations will be applicable once the Agreement on a
Unified Patent Court,2 10 signed by twenty-five EU member states in
February 2013, has been ratified by at least thirteen states. As of
204. Unitary Patent & Unified Patent Court, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE,
https://www.epo.org/law-practice/unitary.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2017)
[http://perma.cc/2ZB9-VJHM (archived Sept. 21, 2017).
205. Id.
206. Commission Regulation 1257/2012 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 17 December 2012 on Implementing Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of
the Creation of Unitary Patent Protection, 2012 O.J. (L 361) 1.
207. The European Patents Office (EPO) is one of the two bodies of the
European Patent Organization (alongside the Administrative Council). EPO has 38
member states across Europe. European Patent Organization, EUROPEAN PATENT
OFFICE, https://www.epo.org/about-us/organisation.htm1 (last visited Oct. 8, 2017)
[http://perma.cc/3X6W-85JH] (archived Sept. 21, 2017).
208. Unitary Patent, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, https://www.epo.org/aw-
practice/unitary/unitary-patent.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2017) [http://perma.ccKZ9T-
J9RT] (archived Sept. 21, 2017).
209. Commission Regulation 1260/2012 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 17 December 2012 on Implementing Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of
the Creation of Unitary Patent Protection, 2012 O.J. (L 361) 89.
210. For the full text of the Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, see 2013 O.J.
(C 175) 1.
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February 2017, twelve member states have already ratified the
Agreement.2 11
The Unified Patent Court will have exclusive jurisdiction for
litigation over European patents with unitary effect. It will include a
Court of First Instance, a Registry, and a Court of Appeal.212 The
Unified Patent Court will thus become the second EU-level
supranational court, after CJEU.
6. International Registry of Interests in Mobile Equipment
Aircraft are probably the quintessential example of assets that
constantly defy national borders in the age of globalization. With
about fifty thousand routes being served globally and one hundred
thousand flights per day,2 13 the movement of aircrafts across national
borders is a trivial matter, but its legal implications are not. This is
especially so with respect to security interests in aircrafts and their
equipment, and the enormous difficulties that financiers/creditors
might face in enforcing their property rights in view of such a
constant movement of the underlying asset.2 14 When a security
interest over the aircraft is registered in one country, but the vehicle
is located in the territory of another country when foreclosure is
required, conflict of laws rules and the lex rei sitae principle may
prove particularly problematic for the creditor and other
stakeholders. This problem is even more acute than in the case of
conventional commercial goods, in which the financier/creditor may
have some advance knowledge about the cross-border destination of
the goods. In the case of an aircraft, the underlying asset may be
found at any point in the world at any given time. The property
strategy that has been devised to address this problem presents what
may be considered the most ambitious version of a supranationalism
strategy today: a global registry.
The UNIDROIT Convention on International Interests in Mobile
Equipment,215 and the Protocol to the Convention on International
211. For a list of the current state of ratifications, see Agreement on a Unified
Patent Court, EUROPEAN COUNCIL, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-
publications/agreements-conventions/agreement/?aid=2013001 [http://perma.ce/B2Y2-
BZCL] (archived Sept. 21, 2017).
212. Unified Patent Court, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, https://www.epo.org/law-
practice/unitary/upc.html#tab1 (last visited Oct. 8, 2017) [http://perma.cc/G3TC-KB8J]
(archived Sept. 21, 2017).
213. The overall number of flights relates to both domestic and international
flights. Gunner Garfors, 100 Flights a Day, GARFORS GLOBE (June 2, 2014),
http://www.garfors.com/2014/06/100000-flights-day.html [http://perma.cc/7WZQ-YEJ7]
(archived Sept. 22, 2017).
214. VAN ERP & AKKERMANS, supra note 152, at 1109-110.
215. Convention on International Interest in Mobile Equipment, Nov. 16, 2001,
2307 U.N.T.S. 285 [hereinafter Cape Town Convention].
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Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters Specific to Aircraft
Equipment,21 6 ratified so far by seventy-three countries,217 establish
this unified registry system.218 The Convention, typically referred to
as the Cape Town Convention, relies on three core institutional and
legal features.219 First, it establishes an "international interest" in
aircrafts or their equipment-airframes, aircraft engines, and
helicopters-that is recognized by all ratifying states.220 Second, it
sets up an international registry, which provides for the electronic
registration of such "international interests," with priority in case of
conflicting interests being determined on a "first-to-file" basis.221 A
registered "international interest" prevails also over an unregistered
interest, even if the holder of the registered interest actually knew of
that unregistered interest.222 Third, the Convention provides interest
holders with various remedies in the event of default.223
The Cape Town Convention establishes the Registrar, as well as
the Supervisory Authority, which is charged, inter alia, with
establishing administrative procedures, supervising the Registrar,
setting fees to be charged for the services, and reporting to the
contracting states.224 The Convention provides, therefore, the
supranational administrative institutional framework required to
operate the international registry and to register the "international
interests."
At the same time, the Convention does not establish a
supranational court or another adjudicative body in charge of
interpreting and applying the Convention or of enforcing the
international interests. In this aspect, the Convention's institutional
structure is fragmented.
Moreover, the Convention does not establish a self-sufficient
legal system that covers all aspects of conflict of laws issues regarding
216. Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment
on Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment, Nov. 16, 2001, 2307 U.N.T.S. 517.
217. In some cases, the Convention has been ratified but has not yet gone into
force in that state. For the current status of the Convention, see Convention on
International Interests in Mobile Equipment, INT'L INST. FOR THE UNIFICATION OF
PRIVATE LAW, http://www.unidroit.org/status-2001capetown (last visited Oct. 8, 2017)
[http://perma.cclD2WV-C24S] (archived Sept. 22, 2017).
218. Additional Convention Protocols on railway equipment and space assets
are not yet in force. SPRANKLING, supra note 47, at 60.
219. Id. at 60-62.
220. Welcome to the International Registry, INT'L REGISTRY OF MOBILE ASSETS,
https://www.internationalregistry.aero/ir-web/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2017)
[http://perma.ce/PR53-AUTPRI (archived Sept. 22, 2017).
221. Id.
222. SPRANKLING, supra note 47, at 61.
223. Id.
224. Cape Town Convention, supra note 215, art. 17.
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both jurisdiction and applicable law.225 As for jurisdiction, the Cape
Town Convention does not include a default rule on jurisdiction.2 26
This means that if a legal proceeding under the Convention is not
covered by one of the specific scenarios set out below, the question of
jurisdiction will be decided by the court of the forum state in which
proceedings have been initiated, based on its internal conflict of laws
rules.227
The specific scenarios that are covered by the Convention in
regard to jurisdiction include: (1) the freedom of the parties to choose
the court of any of the contracting states, and to award exclusive
jurisdiction to such a court;228 (2) the authority of the court chosen by
the parties, or of a court in whose territory the equipment is located,
to grant some types of temporary relief under Article 13 of the
Convention, with other types of temporary relief granting authority to
the court in whose territory the debtor is situated;2 29 and (3) the
granting of exclusive authority to award damages or make orders
against the Registrar to the courts in which the Registrar has its
center of administration.2 3 0 In the case of the registry of aircrafts,
this center is located in Ireland.2 31 Moreover, the Convention
explicitly provides that the jurisdictional rules will not apply to
insolvency proceedings.2 32 The rules on jurisdiction are thus:
incomplete in a number of ways.
As for the applicable law, although the "international interest"
should be supranational in nature, many substantive and procedural
issues may still require further articulation during the legal
proceedings. Questions concerning matters within the scope of the
Convention, but not settled by its substantive law provisions or by
agreement of the parties, would be resolved by domestic substantive
laws. Article 5 of the Convention gives the gap-filling mandate mostly
to the court of the forum state to determine the complementary
substantive law that would apply.2 33
Summing up, the Cape Town Convention is truly innovative in
its particular application of the supranationalism strategy for
property law. It is the first global (applying to seventy-three states)
registry system for any form of property rights. Moreover, although it
focuses on security interests, the ability to register the title of the
225. Karl F. Kreuzer, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law under the Cape Town
Convention and the Protocols Thereto, CAPE TOWN CONVENTION J. 148, 149-51, (2013).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Cape Town Convention, supra note 215, art. 42.
229. Id. art. 43.
230. Id. art. 44.
231. Kreuzer, supra note 225, at 154.
232. Cape Town Convention, supra note 215, art. 45.
233. Kreuzer, supra note 225, at 156-57, 163-64.
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seller/financier under a reservation-of-title clause also expands the
scope of the system to include an ownership registry.234 In the sense
of defining a gentine "international interest," it is the most ambitious
manifestation of the supranationalism strategy.
The institutional facets of the Cape Town Convention and its
Protocols show the prospects, but also the current limits, of bypassing
the national systems. The existence of the Registrar and the
Supervising Authority allow for a truly universal registration of
security interests and a single ranking of priorities of property
interests to the underlying asset. At the same time, the lack of a
supranational court or an adjudicative body may allow for locally
based arbitrage in interpreting the Convention and its application.
Moreover, the reliance of the Convention's rules, regarding both
jurisdiction and applicable law, on the domestic conflict of laws rules
of the forum state allows for some uncertainty among the various
stakeholders. This somewhat undermines the ability of the
international registry of security interests in aircrafts to be truly
detached from national rules.
V. CONCLUSION
Institutions play a key role in the ability of top-down or bottom-
up forces to promote the various strategies for globalization. The
challenge of establishing authorized and coordinated institutions is
particularly acute in the case of property law. Property rights are
based on an in rem principle, which should optimally provide a single
ranking of property interests for different types of assets through
structural and legal features, such as some version of a "closed list"
principle, registries and other forms of publicity, and principles for
prioritization of certain interests over others.
In a global context, this feature of property law requires a cross-
border legal ordering by an array of domestic and supranational
institutions: legislative, administrative, and adjudicative.
As this Article demonstrates, whereas "soft law" instruments or
a conflict of laws strategy may not require binding supranational
institutions, the establishment of such bodies may prove to be critical
for the approximation strategy, and even more so for the
supranationalism strategy.
The scope and authority of such supranational institutions, and
legislative institutions in particular, is currently still fragmented and
incomplete. This institutional deficiency in turn entails challenges for
the ability of bottom-up or top-down forces to move closer to a
234. SPRANKLING, supra note 47, at 61.
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supranational ordering in the various contexts of property law.
Binding supranational institutions with comprehensive lawmaking
power are essential to advance the globalization of property law.

